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Channels of Cooperation:  
A Case Study of Slovenia’s Presidency 






The success of an EU Presidency depends closely on the cooperation it 
achieves with other actors in the European political arena. This paper 
analyses the cooperation established between Slovenian public servants and 
diplomats and their European counterparts during their country’s term in 
office as Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2008. The findings are 
based on a survey conducted among 667 Slovenian public servants, experts 
and diplomats directly involved in the policy-making process during 
Slovenia’s Presidency. It looks into the nature, frequency and importance 
(as rated by Slovenes themselves) of formal and informal cooperation and 
contacts of Slovenian public servants, experts and diplomats with officials of 
the Council Secretariat and European Commission as well as national 
representatives of the other member states. The analysis distinguishes 
between responses by capital- and Brussels-based staff and also reflects the 
views of traditional diplomats at Slovenian diplomatic and consular 
representations. The paper analyses their perception on the cooperation 
established in selected policy fields in which the Presidency assumed 
different roles: organiser, broker, leader and national representative. 
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CHANNELS OF COOPERATION: 
A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA’S PRESIDENCY OF THE EU 




A Presidency of the EU can be evaluated from various angles, depending on one’s aims. It is 
possible to evaluate the progress made in EU policy-making during one Presidency’s term in 
office; its success can be measured against the declared interests of the Presidency or against its 
declared goals or priorities; against the (‘objective’) benchmarks set by the evaluator; or in 
terms of performance in various ‘Presidency tasks’ and/or ‘Presidency roles’, corrected for 
specific characteristics of the presiding country in question.
1 Regardless of which of these 
angles the evaluation focuses on, the performance of the Presidency will be closely linked to the 
cooperation established between the Presidency and various other actors in European policy-
making.  
This paper looks into cooperation between Slovenian public servants and diplomats who 
worked on policy matters and their European counterparts during the Slovenian Presidency of 
the Council of the EU in the first half of 2008. The research question it seeks to answer is: who 
got what kinds of cooperation and from whom?  
The ‘who’ are the actors of the Presidency. This paper focuses exclusively on the Presidency’s 
point of view. The ministers and the highest ranking diplomats posted both in the capital 
(Ljubljana) and at Slovenia’s Permanent Representation (PermRep) in Brussels are just the top 
of the pyramid composed of hundreds of public servants who deal with policy dossiers. The 
most crucial organisational characteristic of any Presidency is the division of labour between the 
capital and the Permanent Representation in Brussels. The paper distinguishes primarily 
between these two types of actors but the analysis also includes traditional diplomats in 
Slovenian diplomatic and consular representations. 
The ‘what’ encompasses information on the issue in question, information on the positions of 
other stakeholders, as well as various modes of cooperation established with them. The 
Presidency’s task of a manager of the Council’s business includes agenda-setting and providing 
leadership at thousands of meetings that need to carefully follow proper procedures. Its 
brokerage function requires the use of various negotiating techniques – in performing all these 
tasks the Presidency does not or cannot afford to act on its own.  
                                                      
*  Sabina Kajnč is a visiting research fellow at CEPS and a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre of 
International Relations in Ljubljana, conducting research thanks to the European Foreign and Security 
Studies fellowship granted by Compagnia di San Paolo. 
1 On the complexity of evaluating the Presidency of the EU, see Quaglia & Moxon-Browne (2006) and 
Schout & Vanhoonacker (2006). While the first study presents a comparative analysis of the Italian and 
Irish Presidencies in 2003, the latter develops a contingency theory to evaluate a Presidency’s 
performance and tests it in the case of the 2001 French Presidency. For a comprehensive evaluation, 
encompassing the internal coordination, European-level achievements and logistical efficiency, within the 
triangle of neutral Presidency, leadership-oriented Presidency and its role of the national representative, 
see IOB (2008) in the context of the Dutch 2004 EU Presidency.  2 | SABINA KAJNČ 
 
The latter observation already touches on the question ‘from whom’. The Council Secretariat 
functions in the Presidency’s service. But there are other actors as well: other EU institutions, 
member states, domestic institutions and various interest groups.
2  
In seeking to answer the above question, the paper analyses the cooperation of the Slovenian 
public servants and diplomats during Slovenia’s term in office as the Presidency of the Council 
of the EU with their European counterparts. It focuses on a few analytical elements. It 
distinguishes between the Slovenian public servants and diplomats who i) worked in Ljubljana 
or ii) were based at the Permanent Representation in Brussels and iii) the traditional diplomats 
at the diplomatic and consular representations of the Republic of Slovenia. It looks at the nature, 
importance and frequency of cooperation and informal contacts with various actors. It 
distinguishes between policy fields falling under the different pillars within the European 
governance system and with respect to different roles the Presidency undertook. It looks 
specifically at the cooperation in: i) foreign policy, ii) justice and home affairs, iii) the common 
agricultural policy, iv) innovation and knowledge society and v) climate and energy.  
The analysis is based on the results of the survey conducted among Slovenian public servants 
immediately following the conclusion of the Slovenian Presidency.
3 The questionnaire, 
composed of 40 closed-type questions, was sent to the public servants working on substantive 
policy issues via the dissemination list of the Presidency sub-group for human resources, which 
included public servants based in Ljubljana. Additionally it was sent to all the expert and 
diplomatic staff based at the Permanent Representation in Brussels and to all the ambassadors of 
the Republic of Slovenia. The response rate was just under two-thirds, but just over half of the 
questionnaires had been completely filled in, while the rest were missing answers to at least one 
of the questions, with most missing out on questions towards the end of the questionnaire.  
This paper first elaborates on the research question and the analytical rationale behind the 
analysis. It explains the ‘who’, the ’what’ and ‘from whom’ and applies them to the specific 
characteristics of the organisation, priorities and interests of the Slovenian Presidency of the 
EU. The second section presents the results and the analysis. The conclusion evaluates the 
results and suggests lessons that can be drawn from the specific experience of the organisation 
of the Slovenian Presidency. The methodology of the study and the limits to its analysis are 
elaborated in Annex 1. 
1.  Cooperation with the Presidency: The who, what and from whom 
1.1 The  main  actors 
Conducting the Presidency places an enormous demand on human resources in any government. 
No matter how big or small the country, although it is clearly more strenuous for small 
                                                      
2 In the period from January 2007 to June 2008, the first ‘trio Presidency’ took place, adding another 
cooperative and coordinating element into the Presidency business. However, since cooperation among 
the three Presidencies was to a large extent confined to the preparation of the joint 18-month programme 
and each trio-partner conducted its respective Presidency largely on its own (see Kajnč, 2008a), 
cooperation on the same ‘what’ with the trio partners during the conduct of the Presidency, as well as 
with the interest groups, is not analysed in this paper. 
3 The survey was conducted by the Centre of International Relations (CIR) at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences of the University of Ljubljana. The project is led by Prof. Dr. Marjan Svetličič, Head of the CIR, 
and Dr. Sabina Kajnč. The questionnaire included aspects of training and competences for the conduct of 
the Presidency, problems encountered during the Presidency, cooperation within Slovenia’s 
administration and with the two trio partners as well as work in the Council working groups and general 
assessment of Slovenia’s Presidency (see Svetličič & Kajnč, 2008 and Kajnč & Svetličič, 2008). For 
details on methodology, see Annex 1. CHANNELS OF COOPERATION: A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA’S EU PRESIDENCY | 3 
 
countries, the Presidency period requires a massive reshuffling of work in the administration to 
cover the regular business and the Presidency tasks as well as additional personnel, often with 
very specific skills. This is even more challenging in the case of the first-time Presidencies of 
the Council, where the government needs to find the optimum mode of organisation, extra 
hiring, reshuffling and training of personnel. Some 2,775 public servants were officially 
involved in the Slovenian Presidency. An extra 300 were hired and the Government also relied 
on 245 students who were employed as interns.
4 Of these, 1,151 worked on substantive policy 
matters, i.e. on dossiers and overall management of the Presidency. The Presidency’s sub-group 
on the human resources dissemination list included 454 public servants directly working on the 
dossiers. The Permanent Representation was staffed with 167 experts and diplomats (the 
number rose for the purposes of the Presidency from the previous 53, since the time of 
accession).  
Early in the preparations of the Presidency (in July 2006), in line with the practice of several 
smaller EU states, Slovenia’s government decided to run a so-called ‘Brussels-based’ (as 
opposed to a ‘capital-based’) Presidency. This model’s main features consist not only of the 
better equipped Permanent Representation in terms of the size of its staff, but also the nature of 
the coordination (horizontal and vertical) and the mandate given to the diplomats at the 
Permanent Representation. Political guidance, choice of priorities, negotiating mandate, control 
and preparation of national positions remain in the capital, while the horizontal coordination 
takes place to a much larger extent among the experts and diplomats at the Permanent 
Representation itself and not (only) between the ministries in the capital. For the duration of the 
Presidency, the experts and diplomats at the Permanent Representation also do not fall clearly in 
the previously – during the period of ‘normal’ membership – established vertical chain of 
command based on strict hierarchy, as the urgency and importance of reporting and 
consultations argue for breaking the strict rules. Also because of its distance from the capital 
and the highest decision-makers in the government, diplomats at the Permanent Representation 
are normally given a much broader negotiating mandate – especially, but not exclusively, on 
issues in which the Presidency is not pursuing its own clear interests – than in ‘normal’ times or 
than it is usual for their counterparts in cases of capital-based Presidencies. The Presidency’s 
diplomats in member states’ and third-country capitals, though far from the main corridors of 
intergovernmental bargaining and community politics in Brussels, take on the role of external 
representative of the EU in their respective capitals. Their contacts with the Council Secretariat 
are limited, but they are frequently in touch with the Commission through its representations in 
the member states and delegations in third countries. In the second part the analysis primarily 
distinguishes among the Slovenian Presidency actors between those from the Permanent 
Representation, those from the capital, and diplomats in member states’ and third-country 
capitals to analyse the differences in ‘what’ and ‘from whom’. 
1.2  Types of cooperation 
One can distinguish between the following types of cooperation: i) for the purpose of the 
agenda-setting, ii) receipt of substantive information on an issue, iii) information on the position 
of other actors, iv) information on procedures and v) in managing the dossier, including the use 
of strategy and negotiating techniques. In terms of contacts, we look at the importance and 
frequency of informal contacts with various actors.  
The type of cooperation that emerges depends mostly on the goals or the stake that actors have 
in the issue and on the nature of the issue within the EU system of governance. A Presidency 
                                                      
4 Details on personnel can be found in the Slovenian Government’s report on the Presidency, adopted on 
3 July 2008 (available at http://www.svez.gov.si/fileadmin/svez.gov.si/pageuploads/docs/ 
predsedovanje_eu/03-07_Porocilo_predsedovanje2008-6_SPREJETO_NA_VLADI.pdf), pp. 115-116). 4 | SABINA KAJNČ 
 
conducts its tasks as a manager of the Council business, external representative of the EU, 
liaison between the institutions, broker and initiator (cf. Wallace & Edwards, 1976; Kietz & 
Perthes, 2007). The role the Presidency assumes in conducting these tasks can vary from simply 
the organiser (or bureaucrat), to mediator (or broker), leader and bargainer (national 
representative) (cf.  Elgström, 2003; Schout & Vanhoonacker, 2006; also Tallberg, 2004, 
specifically on the latter, as amplifier or silencer of national interests). Two factors influence the 
nature of the cooperation: i) the specific role the Presidency undertakes (which varies from one 
issue to another), and ii) the objectives of other stakeholders. In cases where the Presidency 
wants to push for its own goals, it will cooperate less or in a less satisfactory manner (from the 
point of view of Presidency actors) with the actors who oppose the Presidency’s views. The 
Presidency-organiser will cooperate very well with most of the actors and work best with the 
ones with the greatest say in the decision-making process. In cases when the Presidency acts as 
a broker, a small state (and a first time-ever) Presidency is more likely to rely on the expertise 
provided by the Council Secretariat in terms of procedural advice, information on positions and 
suggestions on tactical steps in the negotiations. In situations when the Presidency plays a 
leading role, it will cooperate best with its closest allies, depending on the issue at hand. (cf. 
Beach, 2004; Elgström, 2003). 
The pillar structure, in combination with the stakes or goals of the actors, is the other factor that 
influences the nature of cooperation with other actors. In policy fields with greater competence 
at the EU level, the expertise on the subject at hand lies inside the Commission. Knowledge on 
procedural and tactical questions, on the other hand, is vested within the Council Secretariat. 
Both the Council Secretariat and the Commission are deeply familiar with national positions on 
the issues. The difference however, is that the Council Secretariat is in the service of the 
Presidency and thus provides the Presidency with information, while the Commission is an 
independent stakeholder and uses this knowledge in pursuit of its goals. In second pillar issues, 
however, the Council Secretariat is more likely to have a stronger position on the issues and will 
therefore to a lesser extent serve as a (satisfactory – in the eyes of the Presidency actors) source 
of help on tactical questions. The third pillar’s governance characteristics suggest the more 
balanced role of the Commission and the Council Secretariat on cooperation regarding 
information on the problem and the positions of various stakeholders. 
Slovenia is a small country, the first from the 2004/2007 enlargement round to run the 
Presidency of the Council of the EU. Both its own ambitions and external expectations for its 
Presidency were generally fairly low. It was expected that it would prevailingly choose to act in 
the role of the organiser, taking some leadership role on the issue of the Western Balkans, not 
completely detached from pursuing its own national interests, while Slovenia’s government 
pledged to work towards bringing up solutions through reaching compromises, thus working in 
the mediating or brokerage role.
5  
In order to cover the wide variety of Presidency roles and the differences in governance across 
the pillars, the analysis is broken down into a selection of representative issue areas: i) foreign 
                                                      
5 On the expectations of the Slovenian Presidency in the international press, see e.g. The Economist, 
“Charlemagne: A Balkan Fable”, 6 December 2007; by the expert community in Lang & Maršić (2007). 
Slovenia’s self-view can best be seen in the remarks of Prime Minister Janez Janša in his address to the 
European Parliament on 16 January 2008: “Our Presidency may not be on such a large scale as the 
French, or as high-profile as the German one, and our civil servants may not have such an excellent and 
long-standing tradition as the British. We might make some mistakes, express something too directly or 
perhaps even naively. But we promise to work responsibly and devote ourselves to real issues” (full 
speech available at http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Speeches_Interviews/January/ 
0116PVvEP.html). CHANNELS OF COOPERATION: A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA’S EU PRESIDENCY | 5 
 
policy, ii) justice and home affairs, iii) common agricultural policy, iv) innovation and 
information society and v) climate and energy. 
The first three issues in the most general sense fall under the three distinctive pillars, while the 
fourth and the fifth are characterised by the specific role of the Slovenian Presidency. The issues 
of innovation and information society fall within the scope of the Lisbon Strategy. The launch 
of the third cycle of the renewed Lisbon Strategy was among the top five priorities of the 
Slovenian Presidency as also was the advancement of the climate-energy package.
6 On the 
latter, Slovenia actively played the role of the broker in order to reach an agreement on the 
climate-energy issue at the March European Summit as well as to secure political agreement in 
the Council on the ‘unbundling’ issue before the end of its term in office. With the Commission 
and some of the larger member states, notably France and Germany, on the opposing pole 
concerning the unbundling issue and in relation to the Commission’s Communication “20 20 by 
2020: Europe’s climate change opportunity”,
7 the handling of the dossiers demanded a more 
active brokering role.  
In relation to the innovation and the information society, Slovenia tried to exert political 
leadership by placing these areas at the helm of the third cycle of the Lisbon strategy. The 
Commission advocated an emphasis on the human dimension and labour markets and there 
were loud voices calling from the European Parliament to strengthen the social and employment 
priority.
8 The Slovenian Presidency, however, put investment in knowledge and innovation at 
the forefront of its ‘Lisbon strategy priority’ and pushed hard to reverse the order of the three 
‘Lisbon baskets’ (putting innovation first) and to include the ‘fifth freedom’ of knowledge in the 
Presidency Conclusions of the March 2008 European Council.
9 During its term in office, it 
continued to work actively on the dossier and launched the ‘Ljubljana Process’ of enhanced 
governance within the framework of the European Research Area. 
In the field of agricultural policy and fisheries, Slovenia adopted the organising role. It 
conscientiously undertook the Health Check of the Common Agricultural Policy and it engaged 
equally seriously with the issue of milk quotas. Slovenia had a strong national stake in the 
reform of the wine sector, but since the political compromise on the issue was reached in the 
                                                      
6 The Slovenian Presidency set itself five priorities: i) coordination of the ratification process of the 
Lisbon Treaty, ii) launch of the third cycle of the renewed Lisbon strategy, iii) advancing the climate-
energy package further by seeking an agreement on further liberalisation of the internal market for gas 
and electricity, iv) intercultural dialogue and v) the super priority: bringing the countries of the Western 
Balkans one step closer to the EU. 
7 COM(2008) 30 final, 23 January 2008; in response to the 2007 March European Council’s call for a 
report on the matter on 23 January and the March European Council that was scheduled to debate the 
issue. 
8 See “Keeping up the pace of change”, Commission’s December 2007 Strategic Report; COM (2007) 
803 final, Brussels, 11 December 2007 and the debate in the European Parliament after the Presidency 
presented the programme (see Post-briefing Item: Slovenia takes over EU presidency: prime minister 
addresses European Parliament, 21 January 2008, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20080111BRI18238+ITEM-002-EN+DOC+XML+V0// 
EN&language=EN). 
9 The free circulation of knowledge as an idea was introduced in the Green Paper: “The European 
Research Area: new perspectives (COM(2007) 161 final, 4 April 2007), but was not yet labelled the ‘fifth 
freedom’. 6 | SABINA KAJNČ 
 
Council in December 2007, Slovenia was entrusted with its implementation, thus again taking 
up the organising role.
10  
The roles the Slovenian Presidency played in other areas are not that clear cut, nor is the 
placement of these areas in either the second or the third pillar. Foreign policy falls 
predominantly, but not exclusively, in the second pillar; justice and home affairs cut across all 
three pillars. The ‘super-priority’ of Slovenia’s Presidency – bringing the countries of the 
Western Balkans one step closer to the EU – falls mostly in the foreign policy area, but also 
under justice and home affairs. In case of the Western Balkans, Slovenia exercised a bargaining 
role (cf. Kajnč, 2008b). In securing the negotiating mandate for the Commission for the new 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the Russian Federation, Slovenia took up the 
combined role of broker and leader (Kajnč, 2008a), but on all other foreign policy issues under 
its mandate, it prevailingly acted as organiser.  
The Slovenian Presidency took on numerous issues falling under justice and home affairs and 
acted in various roles. On achieving the visa liberalisation roadmaps for the countries of the 
Western Balkans, its role bordered on that of a bargainer, on SIS II it took up the leadership 
role, in visa facilitation procedures it acted as broker and on other issues (e.g. asylum, 
readmission) it adopted an organising role. This issue thus falls under all pillars and stretches 
over all four roles (cf. Kajnč, 2008a; 2008b; 2009). 
The importance of informal contacts in diplomacy and even more so in ‘European diplomacy’ 
or in Brussels specifically is undisputed. The second part of this analysis looks in detail at the 
value placed on informal contacts and effect the various roles taken by the Presidency might 
have on the value as well as at the frequency of contacts with different actors.  
1.3  Cooperation with whom? 
The European Commission and the Council Secretariat are the most visible actors. The 
Commission is an independent actor, acknowledged as working to the best of the ‘European’ 
interest. The Council Secretariat is supposed to be an impartial body in the service of the 
rotating Presidencies, but its impartiality is often questioned (Beach, 2004). It has been shown 
that its own role has strengthened in the years in the shaping of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and especially since the post of the High Representative for the CFSP 
has been created with the Amsterdam Treaty. Its positions are also more visible on the CFSP 
issues (Dijkstra, 2008). The Presidency is responsible for the Council’s relations with the 
Commission and the European Parliament. The European Parliament is another stakeholder, 
whose role has largely increased in issues where the co-decision procedure applies, but which 
still struggles for a say in matters of foreign policy.  
The member states are the most important stakeholders and any Presidency’s success depends 
on how it will bring about a compromise among them. The nature of relations a EU Presidency 
has with them depends largely on i) the issue at hand, ii) member states’ own interests and iii) 
the objective and strategy of the Presidency. There are various channels the Presidency can use 
to cooperate with the member states. The most obvious one is in Brussels, between the 
diplomats from the member states’ Permanent Representations. Outside Brussels, there are three 
main channels: visits of member states’ diplomats to the capital of the Presidency, networks of 
diplomatic and consular representations and the seconded personnel at the ministries. In the 
preparation of the Presidency and during its term in office the Presidency’s capital city is a very 
likely destination for many member states’ diplomats and experts, who approach the Presidency 
                                                      
10 Interview, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Ljubljana, 3 June 2008; see also reports on 
the Presidency by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (available at 
http://www.mkgp.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/predsedovanje_eu). CHANNELS OF COOPERATION: A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA’S EU PRESIDENCY | 7 
 
in order to influence it to work towards the given stakeholder’s most desirable outcome on 
specific issue(s). Furthermore, the secondment in the Presidency ministries increases in time 
prior to the Presidency – in Slovenia’s Government there were altogether 34 seconded personnel 
from the member states, from the European Commission and the Council Secretariat, 29 in 
Ljubljana (16 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), four at the Permanent Representation and one 
at Slovenia’s Mission to the United Nations in New York. With the exceptions of Estonia, Malta 
and Luxembourg, all other member states have residential embassies in Ljubljana. The analysis 
below focuses also on the cooperation on information-sharing on the substantive issues and on 
the national positions, as it specifically looks at the use of seconded personnel and the 
diplomatic and consular representations of the member states (and third states) by the Slovenian 
Presidency actors. The paper also looks at cooperation achieved via diplomatic and consular 
representations of third states and at international organisations. 
2.  Cooperation between Slovenian Presidency actors and ‘European’ 
actors 
2.1 Frequency  of  information on substance and positions 
The general overview of the frequency of substantive information received from various actors 
shows that the Council Secretariat, Permanent Representation and the Commission were the 
most frequent source of this information. The percentages also show that those based at the 
Permanent Representation profited most from the information by the Council Secretariat and the 
Commission. It is also evident that the Council Secretariat is clearly more often a source of 
information on foreign policy issues than the Commission. 
The low frequency of contacts with the European Parliament can partly be attributed to centrally 
run and specifically designated personnel both in Ljubljana and at the Permanent 
Representation, who acted as liaisons between the Presidency and the European Parliament. 
Despite this, the differences in the frequency of contacts between the Permanent Representation 
and those who worked specifically on the foreign policy issues suggests that i) there were 
contacts outside of the few specially assigned people and ii) the European Parliament as a 
source of information on the (foreign policy) issue plays a minor role.  
Table 1. Frequency of receiving substantive information on issues: European institutions  
(% of total responses) 
 Never  Occasionally  Regularly 
Council Secretariat  
Full sample  15.8  18.4  65.8 
PermRep 0  5.9  94.1 
Capital 12.1  14.9  73.0 
DiCo 30.0  36.7  33.3 
Foreign policy  9.6  23.3  67.1 
European Commission 
Full sample  12.0  32.0  56.0 
PermRep 5.9  20.6  73.5 
Capital 9.2  33.8  57.0 
DiCo 22.6  38.7  38.7 
Foreign policy  20.5  30.1  49.3 
European Parliament 
Full sample  43.5  39.1  23.5 
PermRep 23.5  52.9  23.5 
Capital 42.4  36.7  20.9 
DiCo 56.7  33.3  10.0 
Foreign policy  47.9  39.4  12.7 8 | SABINA KAJNČ 
 
Note: Numbers represent the percentages. The full sample is the total number answered on the question of 
the frequency of their contacts, irrespective of whether they answered on the question of their post or their 
policy field. The number varies between 260 and 275. For all other groups the numbers are fixed: 
Permanent Representation in Brussels (PermRep) = 35, Capital = 143; Diplomatic and Consular 
representations of the Republic of Slovenia (DiCo) = 31 and those who worked on foreign policy and 
external relations (foreign policy) = 73. 
Table 2 shows the frequency with which information was received on substantive issues from 
Slovenia’s public administration based in Ljubljana, the Permanent Representation and the 
diplomatic and consular representations. The Permanent Representation clearly stands out as the 
most forthcoming in offering information, but the data also reveal one significant closed circle: 
diplomatic and consular representations also during the Presidency to a far greater extent served 
as a source of information in the field of foreign policy and much less across the various 
European policies.  
Table 2. Frequency of receiving substantive information: Slovenia’s institutions 
 Never  Occasionally  Regularly 
National public administration 
Full sample  20.3  51.7  28.0 
PermRep 20.0  42.9  37.1 
Capital 21.0  55.1  23.9 
DiCo 30.0  54.8  45.2 
Foreign policy  15.3  48.6  36.1 
Permanent Representation in Brussels 
Full sample  9.5  24.1  66.4 
PermRep 0.0  14.7  85.3 
Capital 5.6  27.5  66.9 
DiCo 16.1  29.0  54.8 
Foreign policy  11.1  25.0  63.9 
Diplomatic and consular representations of Slovenia 
Full sample  41.3  34.7  24.0 
PermRep 26.5  44.1  29.4 
Capital 51.1  30.5  18.4 
DiCo 0.0  58.1  41.9 
Foreign policy  8.2  43.8  47.9 
 
Similarly as above, the data for member states’ and third states’ diplomatic representatives as 
well as international organisations also show that these actors still, in line with tradition, 
approached, or were approached by, those working in foreign policy to a much greater extent 
than the average, which includes the whole range of policies dealt with in the EU. This is not 
surprising, just as it is not that member states’ diplomatic representatives show the highest 
frequency of contacts for the purpose of exchanging (or delivering) information on the content 
of the problem. The data on seconded personnel reveal that they are far from being a general 
source of information on the substance of the issue, and even less so, on the position of other 
actors. Their number (34 all together) suggests they were in touch with the limited number of 
Slovenian personnel, working on a narrow or very specific issue, which might explain the stable 
percentage among those who received information from the seconded personnel regularly (see 
also Table 6 below).  
 CHANNELS OF COOPERATION: A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA’S EU PRESIDENCY | 9 
 
Table 3. Frequency of receiving substantive information: Member states’ channels, third states 
and other international organisations 
 Never  Occasionally  Regularly 
Seconded personnel  
Full sample  58.3  27.8  13.9 
PermRep 77.4  9.7  12.9 
Capital 55.5  31.4  13.1 
DiCo 50.0  46.4  3.6 
Foreign policy  55.7  31.4  12.9 
Diplomatic and consular representations of member states  
Full sample  54.3  34.8  10.9 
PermRep 64.7  26.5  8.8 
Capital 57.9  34.3  7.9 
DiCo 10.3  58.6  31.0 
Foreign policy  28.2  52.1  19.7 
Diplomatic and consular representations of third states 
Full sample  69.4  26.4  4.2 
PermRep 62.5  31.3  6.3 
Capital 73.6  23.6  2.9 
DiCo 41.4  48.3  10.3 
Foreign policy  53.5  38.0  8.5 
Other international organisations 
Full sample  20.3  51.7  28.0 
PermRep 20.0  42.9  37.1 
Capital 21.0  55.1  23.9 
DiCo 0.0  54.8  45.2 
Foreign policy  19.2  60.3  20.5 
 
Frequencies of information on the position of other actors do not differ much from the above 
frequencies of the information on the content of the problem in terms of importance of the 
specific actors. It is, however, notable that on average, frequencies of information on positions 
are lower all across the actors, with the exception of diplomatic and consular representations. 
The traditional role of diplomats in gathering information and reporting on positions is most 
visible in comparison with the lesser informative role on positions by other actors.  
Table 4. Frequency of receiving information on the position of other actors on substantive 
issues: European institutions 
 Never  Occasionally  Regularly 
Council Secretariat  
Full sample  20.5  31.1  48.5 
PermRep 2.9  28.6  68.6 
Capital 18.7  28.1  53.2 
DiCo 38.7  38.7  22.6 
Foreign policy  18.1  34.7  47.2 
European Commission 
Full sample  19.2  43.6  37.2 
PermRep 14.3  40.0  45.7 
Capital 19.7  43.7  36.6 
DiCo 16.7  43.3  40.0 
Foreign policy  29.2  36.1  34.7 10 | SABINA KAJNČ 
 
European Parliament 
Full sample  56.9  30.4  12.7 
PermRep 34.3  57.1  8.6 
Capital 59.6  27.2  13.2 
DiCo 63.3  20.0  16.7 
Foreign policy  60.6  31.0  8.5 
 
Even more revealing are the correlations between both types of information (on substance and 
on positions) and various actors. There are three clusters of significant
11 positive correlations 
between both. The first cluster forms strong correlations between the both types of information. 
The actors who provide one type of information also provide the other type of information. The 
strength of correlations vary slightly, with the strongest correlations among the traditional 
diplomatic actors from the diplomatic and consular representations (correlation for both types of 
information from the Slovenian diplomatic and consular representation is at 0.813), followed by 
the Permanent Representation (0.770), the Council Secretariat (0.758), the European Parliament 
(0.716), the Commission (0.646) and the Slovenian public administration (0.636). Another 
cluster showing a strong positive correlation is formed among the European institutions and the 
Slovenian Permanent Representation. Correlations in this cluster are weaker; the positive 
correlation, however, is strongest between obtaining information on the positions from both, the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat (0.495) and information on the problem from the 
Commission and information on the positions from the Council Secretariat (0.424). The third 
cluster is formed by the traditional diplomatic actors, Slovenian, member states’ and third 
states’ diplomatic representations, where correlations are even slightly stronger (between 0.3 
and 0.6). Slovenian public administration, other than the Permanent Representation, regarding 
both types of information shows none (not significant) or very weak correlations (between 0.1 
and 0.2) with European level institutions.  
Table 5. Frequency of receiving information on the position of other actors: Slovenia’s 
institutions 
 Never  Occasionally  Regularly 
Slovenia’s public administration 
Full sample  32.8  49.4  17.7 
PermRep 34.3  51.4  14.3 
Capital 38.6  46.4  15.0 
DiCo 6.5  54.8  38.7 
Foreign policy  27.8  47.2  25.0 
Permanent Representation in Brussels 
Full sample  16.7  29.3  54.0 
PermRep 9.1  21.2  69.7 
Capital 14.1  30.3  55.6 
DiCo 20.7  34.5  44.8 
Foreign policy  18.8  26.1  55.1 
Diplomatic and consular representations of Slovenia 
Full sample  42.4  37.9  19.7 
PermRep 25.7  62.9  1.4 
Capital 50.4  31.2  18.4 
DiCo 6.5  51.6  41.9 
Foreign policy  11.0  47.9  41.1 
                                                      
11 All correlations mentioned are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  CHANNELS OF COOPERATION: A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA’S EU PRESIDENCY | 11 
 
Table 6. Frequency of receiving information on the position of other actors: Member states’ 
channels, third states and other international organisations 
 Never  Occasionally  Regularly 
Seconded personnel  
Full sample  63.9  27.8  8.3 
PermRep 75.0  21.9  3.1 
Capital 60.7  31.1  8.1 
DiCo 57.1  35.7  7.1 
Foreign policy  61.8  29.4  8.8 
Diplomatic and consular representations of member states  
Full sample  58.8  31.9  9.3 
PermRep 64.7  29.4  5.9 
Capital 64.7  29.5  5.8 
DiCo 14.8  51.9  33.3 
Foreign policy  41.2  42.6  16.2 
Diplomatic and consular representations of third states 
Full sample  74.8  20.2  5.0 
PermRep 82.1  13.6  4.3 
Capital 46.4  42.9  10.7 
DiCo 74.8  20.3  5.0 
Foreign policy  55.1  36.2  8.7 
Other international organisations 
Full sample  47.7  42.7  9.5 
PermRep 38.2  55.9  5.9 
Capital 52.9  39.3  7.9 
DiCo 13.3  60.0  26.7 
Foreign policy  38.0  45.1  16.9 
 
2.2  Perceived success of cooperation 
We analysed the Slovenian Presidency actors’ rating of success of cooperation with the Council 
Secretariat, the Commission and national representatives of member states for the five ‘what’ 
aspects, across the abovementioned selected policies and specifically according to where they 
were based. Tables 7, 8 and 9 below show the mean of success rates on the scale from one to 
five, with five presenting the highest rate. We also calculated the correlations between the 
various ‘what’ and ‘from whom’. The most significant results are presented at the end of this 
section.  
As shown in Tables 7-9 below, the perceived success of cooperation of Slovenian Presidency 
actors with the Council Secretariat, the Commission as well as with the national representatives 
was generally very positive. On a scale from one to five, the average grade (mean) does not fall 
under three for any aspect of the analysis, whereas many average grades are significantly above 
four. The comparison between the institutions shows a generally highly positively rated 
cooperation with the Council Secretariat, significantly more positive than the cooperation with 
the Commission. Although the differences are small between the selected policy fields and 
between the Ljubljana-based, Brussels-based and those from the diplomatic and consular 
representations, they allow for comparisons and interpretations.  
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Full sample  4.46  4.25  4.11  4.35  3.97 
Foreign policy  4.85  4.23  4.02  4.33  3.92 
JHA 4.74  4.41  4.21  4.41  4.18 
Agriculture 4.21  4.13  4.08  4.25  4.04 
Research 4.75  4.83  4.50  4.56  4.50 
Energy&Environment 4.59  4.42  4.48  4.39  4.19 
Capital / FP  4.52 / 
4.43 
4.32 / 4.20  4.18 / 3.97  4.39 / 4.33  4.01 / 3.83 
PermRep / FP  4.65 / 
4.80 
4.38 / 4.53  4.21 / 4.20  4.61 / 4.40  4.26 / 4.20 
DiCo / FP  4.30 / 
4.71 
3.36 / 3.75  3.40 /3.86  3.60 / 4.14  3.30 /3.71 
Notes: For Tables 9-11, Full sample = 187 – 200; Foreign policy and external relations (Foreign policy) = 
47 – 70; Justice and home affairs (JHA) = 31 – 41; Agriculture, fisheries and forestry (Agriculture) = 23 – 
33; Research, innovation and information society (Research) = 12 – 17; Energy and environment = 37 – 
51; Capital 107 – 113 (Capital / FP = 25); Permanent Representation (PermRep) = 31 – 34 (PermRep / FP 
= 12); Diplomatic and consular representations (DiCo) = 19 (DiCo / FP = 10)). 
Table 7 on cooperation with the Council Secretariat shows that the highest perceived success 
was in those aspects where the Council Secretariat formally assists the Presidency: agenda-
setting and providing procedural information. Information on the content of the problem and on 
the issues of other actors are not graded much lower, but already come very close to the 
perceived success in cooperation on these two aspects with the national representatives (with the 
exceptions of research, innovation and information society; and energy and environment; see 
Table 9). The difference between the various aspects of cooperation is biggest in the fields of 
justice and home affairs and of foreign policy, which is shown also when foreign policy actors 
are broken down according to their base.  
On the other hand, the perceived success of cooperation with the Council Secretariat between 
capital- and Brussels-based Slovenian staff does not differ, with the exception of cooperation on 
running the dossier, strategy and negotiating techniques, where diplomats and experts from the 
Permanent Representations, especially those working on foreign policy issues, rated the 
cooperation with the Council Secretariat higher than their counterparts in Ljubljana.  
Diplomatic and consular representatives are most critical towards cooperation with the Council 
Secretariat (and slightly less the Commission, see Tables 7 and 8), but those working in foreign 
policy rated the success of cooperation with the Council Secretariat on running the dossier, 
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Full sample  3.99  4.03  3.56  3.46  3.37 
Foreign policy  3.85  3.88  3.39  3.25  3.29 
JHA 4.28  4.09  3.65  3.62  3.58 
Agriculture 4.00  3.96  3.57  3.43  3.09 
Research 3.93  4.36  3.86  3.64  3.29 
Energy&Environment 4.12 4.09  3.79  3.35  3.55 
Capital / FP  4.08 / 
3.67 
3.99 / 3.72  3.56 / 3.36  3.52 / 3.28  3.45 /3.28 
PermRep / FP  4.03 / 
4.25 
4.23 / 4.25  3.42 /3.25  3.42 / 3.42  3.35 / 3.67 
DiCo / FP  3.78 /3.82  3.79 /3.83  3.37 / 3.58  3.06 / 3.00  3.00 / 2.91 
 
Cooperation with the Commission (Table 8) has been rated lower in general than with the 
Council Secretariat, but in line with its role, cooperation on agenda-setting, the substance of the 
issue and (slightly less) on the positions of other actors is rated higher than cooperation on the 
procedure. Similarly to the Council Secretariat, cooperation on running the dossier, strategy and 
negotiations is rated lowest. These figures, both for the Commission and the Council, confirm 
the formal roles the institutions have in relation to the Presidency. Analysis of differences 
between the policy fields reveals lowest rates for foreign policy, which is understandable taking 
into account the Commission’s competences. This is best seen when comparing the success 
rates between the capital- and Brussels-based actors generally and in the foreign policy field. 
Capital-based foreign policy actors rated cooperation with the Commission lower than average 
on all aspects of cooperation, while the Brussels-based foreign policy actors do not differ from 
the average rate on cooperation calculated for the Brussels-based actors.  
Cooperation with national representatives (Table 9) was generally rated slightly lower than with 
the Council Secretariat, but better than with the Commission. The highest rated aspects of 
cooperation are on the information on the substantive issue and on the positions. Cooperation on 
how to run the dossier, the use of strategy and the negotiating technique was rated slightly 
lower, but in comparison to differences between various aspects of cooperation in case of the 
Council Secretariat and the Commission, it was rated higher. 
Across the policy fields, the differences are small, but they are not insignificant. In agriculture, 
where the Presidency took on the organising role, the cooperation with the Commission was 
rated lower than in research, innovation and information society, where the Presidency acted as 
leader, and in energy and environment, where the Presidency acted as broker (and where the 
Commission’s position was opposite to that of some of the biggest member states). Cooperation 
on agriculture with the Council Secretariat was also lower than in other selected policy fields; 
but it was comparatively better with national representatives.  
In justice and home affairs, a policy field that stretches across all the pillars and in which the 
Slovenian Presidency performed a variety of roles, cooperation was rated very high with all 
other actors (only cooperation in some aspects with the Commission in research, innovation and 14 | SABINA KAJNČ 
 
information society and cooperation on agenda-setting in foreign policy with the Council 
Secretariat was rated higher).  























Full sample  3.81  4.12  4.01  3.36  3.55 
Foreign policy  3.93  4.21  4.02  3.30  3.60 
JHA 4.10  4.28  4.09  3.63  3.71 
Agriculture 3.83  4.33  4.08  3.42  3.67 
Research 3.46  4.00  3.77  3.23  3.23 
Energy&Environment 3.92  4.31  4.03  3.49  3.65 
Capital / FP  3.77 / 
3.90 
4.11 / 4.23  3.98 / 4.00  3.23 / 3.00  3.50 / 3.58 
PermRep / FP  3.74 / 
3.69 
4.23 / 4.23  4.10 / 4.15  3.45 / 3.46  3.52 / 3.38 
DiCo / FP  4.14 / 
4.21 
4.10 / 4.14  3.86 / 3.93  3.70 / 3.85  3.71 / 3.86 
 
In the field of research, innovation and information society, where the Presidency was pursuing 
the leadership role, the average success attributed to cooperation with the Council Secretariat is 
highest for all five aspects and in relation to the Commission it is highest in case of the 
substantive information (suggesting that the nationality of top Commission officials should not 
be underestimated),
12 but lower on other aspects, which is understandable when taking into 
account that the Presidency’s views were not in line with the solutions defended by the 
Commission (and suggesting that the nationality of top Commission officials should not be 
overestimated). Cooperation with national representatives, on the other hand, was rated 
significantly lower.  
In energy and environment Slovenia acted as broker. The analysis shows very high rates of 
cooperation with all actors in all aspects, especially on managing the dossier, strategy and 
negotiating techniques.  
Correlations between the type of cooperation and ‘from whom’ reveal the strongest positive and 
statistically significant correlations
13 between various aspects of cooperation with one actor. The 
strongest are correlations between the various aspects of cooperation with the Council 
Secretariat (0.624 – 0.788; with the strongest correlation between the information on the content 
of the issue and the positions of other actors), followed by the medium strong correlations on 
cooperation with the Commission (0.407 – 0.690; the strongest being the correlation between 
information on procedure and information on how to run the dossier), and a more widely spread 
weak to strong positive correlation of cooperation with the national representatives (0.442 – 
0.765; again with the strongest correlation between information on procedure and information 
on how to run the dossier). 
                                                      
12 The Commissioner responsible for the policy field, Janez Potočnik, is Slovenian.  
13 All correlations mentioned are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). CHANNELS OF COOPERATION: A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA’S EU PRESIDENCY | 15 
 
Across the three actors (the Commission, the Council Secretariat and national representatives) 
the correlations are statistically significant and stronger (but much weaker than within each 
actor, ranging between 0.2 and 0.4) between the Commission and the Council Secretariat. With 
respect to the various types of cooperation, the strongest correlations are for cooperation on 
procedural question and on agenda-setting (0.404 and 0.402 respectively, between the 
Commission and national representatives). There are statistically significant but weak 
correlations between the information on the position of various actors and all aspects of 
cooperation with national representatives. In the case of the Council Secretariat and national 
representatives, there are weak statistically significant correlations between the information on 
the positions of other actors from both, the Council Secretariat and national representatives, and 
between cooperation with both actors on managing the dossier.  
2.3  Importance and frequency of informal contacts 
Another point examined was the importance of informal personal or telephone contacts for the 
success of the work undertaken. Table 10 below indicates the high importance of informal 
contacts, with expected differences with respect to the base of respondents. Diplomatic and 
consular actors are used to informal contacts and are likely to attach more importance to them 
than other actors in the national administration. They can therefore serve as a benchmark. The 
capital-based actors deemed the informal contacts almost as important as the traditional 
diplomats, while those based at the Permanent Representation exceeded this by almost ten 
percentage points.  
Table 10. The importance of informal contacts for accomplishing the work, based on affiliation 
of respondent 
 Full  sample 
(N = 223) 
Capital-based 
(N = 140) 
PermRep-based 
(N = 34) 
DiCo-based 
(N = 31)  
Affirmative  78.5 77.9 91.2 80.6 
Negative 21.5  22.1  8.8  19.4 
 
It is more striking to look at the breakdown of the importance of contacts according to selected 
policy fields (Table 11). What sticks out is the relative lower importance of the informal 
contacts deemed by those who worked in research, innovation and information society and 
those who worked on energy and environmental issues. In these two fields, Slovenia pursued 
the roles of leader and broker respectively, meaning it was more engaged and placed more 
weight on achieving specific goals. The lower importance can be explained by three factors: i) 
in these fields there was strong political will and support, which means that more senior actors 
engaged in formal conversations; ii) these actors are relatively underrepresented in the study 
(only one minister or state secretary filled-in the questionnaire); and iii) due to the importance 
attached to obtaining results on these issues, they might have been off limits to actors lower in 
the administration’s hierarchy and with that to the informal contacts established among them. 
The opposite interpretations are possible for the agricultural, fisheries and forestry policy, where 
Slovenia assumed the role of organiser: i) lower-level actors were engaged to a greater extent, 
ii) the political support was smaller and iii) the dossier still had to be managed, and those 
responsible for it simply relied more on their own informal contacts in the absence of 
engagement from higher-profile officials.  
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(N = 72) 
JHA  
(N = 44) 
Agriculture 
(N = 35) 
Research 
(N = 17) 
Energy & 
environment 
(N = 52) 
Affirmative 84.7  84.1  80  70.6  71.7 
Negative 15.3  15.9  20  29.4  28.8 
 
Table 12 reveals the frequency of contacts with various actors in respect to the affiliation of the 
Slovenian Presidency actors. Similarities between the frequency of contacts of traditional 
diplomatic and consular staff and staff based at the Permanent Representation with the 
Slovenian administration in Ljubljana and with national representatives of other member states 
suggest a traditional pattern of informal diplomatic relations also in respect to the Permanent 
Representation. The higher level of contacts in Brussels can be attributed to the saturation of 
actors and frequency of meetings in Brussels.  
The relatively high frequency of diplomatic and consular representatives’ interactions with the 
Commission’s staff holds for their respective capitals and suggests cooperation with the 
Commission’s representation or delegation there (the Council Secretariat’s staff obviously not 
being present or not regularly present, therefore, lower frequencies in this case), but in 
comparison to the frequency of contacts with national representatives, thus their traditional 
diplomatic counterparts, the contacts with the Commission’s staff are notably less frequent.  
The Permanent Representation’s staff naturally had more contacts with all other European-level 
actors and of course most often with the Council Secretariat’s staff. With respect to the staff in 
the capital, it is interesting to note that informal contacts with all other actors with the exception 
of members or staff from the European Parliament match or even exceed (in case of contacts 
with the Council Secretariat’s staff) the frequency of contacts inside the Slovenian 
administration.  
The low frequency of contacts with the members and the staff of the European Parliament is in 
line with above presented results on frequency and content of cooperation, confirming the lesser 
role of the European Parliament, but also a more concentrated form of cooperating with it by the 
Slovenian Presidency.  
Table 12. Frequency of informal contacts 
Actor Affiliation  Very  seldom Seldom  Often  Very  often 
Capital (143)  7.7  18.3  43.7  30.3 
PermRep (35)  2.9  8.6  28.6  60.0 
Slovenian public 
administration 
actors  DiCo (30)  0.0  10.0  33.3  56.7 
Capital (141)  14.2  12.1  32.6  41.1 
PermRep (35)  0.0  0.0  8.6  91.4 
Council 
Secretariat’s 
staff  DiCo (28)  39.3  25.0  14.3  21.4 
Capital (143)  9.9  22.7  39.0  28.4 
PermRep (35)  2.9  11.4  14.3  71.4 
Commission’s 
staff  
DiCo (30)  23.3  6.7  40.0  30.0 
Capital (141)  5.0  16.3  51.1  27.7 
PermRep (35)  0.0  0.0  17.1  82.9 
National repre-
sentatives of the 
member states  DiCo (30)  0.0  0.0  30.0  70.0 
Capital (139)  56.8  28.8  8.6  5.8 
PermRep (35)  25.7  28.6  37.1  8.6 
MEPs or staff of 
the EP 
DiCo (27)  85.2  14.8  0.0  0.0 
Note: The figures in brackets show the number of responses; the results are given in percentages. CHANNELS OF COOPERATION: A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA’S EU PRESIDENCY | 17 
 
3. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the results of a survey taken of the principal actors in the Slovenian 
Presidency of the EU Council of their cooperation with other actors in the European political 
arena: the Council Secretariat, the European Commission and national representatives of 
member states, including diplomatic actors of third states. This paper’s findings are constrained 
by its self-evaluative character, the under-representation of the highest level of Slovenian 
decision-makers and its limited results concerning the differences in the three pillars.  
Nevertheless, the analysis allows for some significant conclusions. First, the Permanent 
Representation was the most important actor in the Slovenian Presidency in terms of 
cooperation and contacts, both formal and informal, with European institutions and member 
states as well as with the Presidency’s own administration in the capital. It was the Presidency’s 
eyes and ears, across the entire range of policies. The rest of the public administration in the 
capital had far less contact with the European-level actors, although that contact was not 
significantly less satisfactory. 
Second, during Slovenia’s Presidency the Council Secretariat and the Commission performed 
their long-established roles in relation to the Presidency. The Council Secretariat’s staff was the 
Presidency’s best ally. It guided it through the procedures and it provided most often the most 
useful information. It performed these formal roles to a much greater satisfaction than it did in 
providing guidance on running the dossier and negotiations. A lower level of perceived success 
with the Council Secretariat in the field of cooperation does not allow us to conclude whether or 
not the Council Secretariat was not sufficiently helpful or that its assistance was not always 
welcome, but in any case it suggests that the Presidency needed diplomatic staff with traditional 
diplomatic competences. Though to a slightly lesser extent and more susceptible to its own 
interests, this also held for cooperation with the Commission. Despite the more centrally run 
relations with the European Parliament the low frequencies and low rated cooperation with it, 
suggest that the European Parliament is still of lesser importance in running a EU Presidency.  
Third, the Presidency is foremost the Presidency of the Council of the EU, where member states 
work closely together. Generally during the Slovenian Presidency it was a very frequent and 
positively rated cooperation, especially on information but also in terms of advice on 
negotiations with the member states. Cooperation was stable across all the policies, with the 
exception of research, innovation and information society – the field where Slovenia tried to act 
as a leader. Seconded personnel were shown to be confined to a very limited circle and not 
really fully appreciated. The question arises whether the seconded personnel could be used 
better to the advantage of the Presidency, if the administration were more used to having access 
to such additional expertise around, which cannot be said to be the case in Slovenia’s public 
administration. 
Fourth, traditional diplomats must not be underestimated. The Presidency does not only run in 
Brussels and in the capital of the member state in the Presidency seat, but also in member states’ 
and third states’ capitals. Traditional diplomats are among the most reliable source of 
information in general and on the positions of other actors in particular. They are traditionally 
more involved in the strict foreign policy issues. The analysis suggests that their range of work 
should be expanded to cover European policy-making across all policies.  
Last, the Presidency works best when it is highly engaged. The organising Presidency will be 
technical and (perceived) cooperation with other actors less successful. The leader can 
experience difficulties, but the brokering Presidency can count on help, especially with running 
the dossier and in negotiations.  18 | 
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Annex 1. Methodology 
he analysis is based on the results of an electronic survey conducted among Slovenia’s 
public servants directly involved in substantive issues as experts or diplomats, in the 
conduct of the country’s Presidency in the first six months of 2008. The survey, 
comprising 40 closed-type questions, was distributed on 9
 July 2008 to 667 individuals through 
the email distribution list of the Presidency sub-group for human resources, the email list of 
expert and diplomatic personnel at the Permanent Representation and directly to the email 
addresses of the ambassadors of the Republic of Slovenia. The electronic questionnaire 
remained accessible until 4 September 2008.  
The survey represents a self-evaluation of the actors directly involved in the activity that is 
being evaluated. Self-evaluation is a necessary element of any review of the activity, albeit it is 
only one of the techniques of any evaluation. This poses limits to the objectivity of the answers 
and thus to interpretation of the results presented in this paper. It needs to be pointed out that the 
survey was conducted independently of Slovenia’s Government, it was fully anonymous and it 
was conducted shortly after the end of the evaluated activity, thus avoiding distortions by time 
distance – these elements speak in favour of the interpretative value of the results. The response 
rate (407 submitted questionnaires, out of these 209 complete), as well as the distribution of 
answers in terms of post-variation of the public servants and the diplomats (capital- and 
Brussels-based, also in terms of hierarchy, with the exception of the highest political decision-
makers, who are underrepresented in the survey; see Table A.1) and the policy fields they were 
engaged in (see Table A.2) also speak in favour of the representative nature of the results and 
thus allow for their interpretation.  
Table A.1 Distribution of respondents according to the hierarchy in the public service, 
separating the diplomats based at the Permanent Representation in Brussels and the 
ambassadors 
Post Number  Percentage  of  respondents 
Ministers, State Secretaries   1  0.5 
Heads of Division  38  18.2 
Heads of Unit  36  17.2 
Diplomats at the Permanent Representation in Brussels  35 16.7 
Ambassadors  31 14.8 
Desk officers  46  22.0 
Policy analyst, expert  22  10.5 
Total 209  100.0 
 
With regard to the policy fields it needs to be noted that respondents could mark several fields. 
Although there are differences in the absolute numbers, they roughly represent the relative share 
of public servants working in the specific fields during the Presidency. 
For the purpose of analysis in this paper, the respondents were re-grouped into three categories: 
capital-based, Brussels-based and embassy-based. As explained above, only some of the policy 
fields are covered in the analysis (indicated in italics in Table A.2), with environment and 
energy grouped together into a single variable. The base of respondents and the policy fields 
represent the independent variables. 
The dependent variables are the frequency of cooperation with various actors on obtaining the 
information on substance of the problem and on the positions of various actors, the level of 
(perceived) success of cooperation with various actors in different aspects of cooperation and 
importance and frequency of informal contacts.  
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Table A.2 Representation across the policy fields 
Policy field  Number  Percentage of 
respondents 
Foreign and security policy, external relations  73 17.4 
Justice and home affairs (justice, freedom and security), fight 
against fraud 
44 10.5 
Agriculture, fisheries, forestry  36 8.6 
Development cooperation, humanitarian aid, human rights  33  7.9 
Environment  29 6.9 
Internal market, Competition, Consumer protection, enterprise  28  6.7 
Energy  23 5.5 
Economy and monetary affairs  21  5.0 
Public health, Food safety  21  5.0 
Enlargement 19  4.5 
External trade, customs  17  4.1 
Research, innovation, information society  17 4.1 
Education, training, youth, employment and social affairs  16  4.0 
Traffic, maritime issues  13  3.1 
Culture, audiovisual, media  12  3.0 
Institutional matters, budget, taxation  10  2.4 
Regional policy  7  1.6 
Total 419  100 
 
The frequency of cooperation was checked specifically for obtaining substantive information 
and on the positions of other actors on the issue. The possible answers were: never, occasionally 
and regularly. We asked on frequency of cooperation with the following actors: Council 
Secretariat, Commission, European Parliament, Slovenia’s public administration (with the 
exception of Permanent Representation in Brussels), Permanent Representation in Brussels, 
seconded personnel at the ministries, diplomatic and consular representations of the Republic of 
Slovenia, diplomatic and consular representations of member states of the EU, diplomatic and 
consular representations of third countries, other international organisations.  
The question on the rating of success of cooperation in various aspects was measured on a scale 
from one to five, with five presenting the best rate of success. We asked on the cooperation in 
agenda setting, substantive information on the problem, information on positions of other actors, 
information on procedural question, cooperation in running of the dossier and on the use of 
strategy and negotiating tactics. We asked these questions specifically for: Commission, 
Council Secretariat and national representatives.  
With regard to the importance and frequency of informal contacts, we asked whether informal 
contacts were crucial for the successful achievements and we specifically asked for the 
frequency of contacts with the following actors: Slovenia’s public servants and diplomats, 
national representatives of member states, officials at the Council Secretariat, officials at the 
Commission, officials and members of the European Parliament and interest groups and non-
governmental organisations (the latter not being included in the analysis in this paper). The 
possible answers were: very rare, rare, frequent and very frequent.  
Due to the nature of the variables and the sample, the analysis is limited to descriptive statistics, 
frequencies, cross tabulation and means comparison as well as correlations. In each section of 
the analysis, the results for the entire sample are first presented and then the analysis is broken 
down with regard to the independent variables. Recent EPIN Working Papers 
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